Estimates of the regional effects of NAFTA are interesting in themselves, but they also serve a more general purpose. Specifically, they provide support for the hypothesis that, because it does not account for the spatial or geographic effects of integration, standard customs union theory is inadequate for capturing the effects of preferential trading areas (PTAs). The geographic approach is a break from standard empirical analyses of PTAs in that it recognizes that the nation is not always the relevant unit of reference for international trade (Krugman, 1991a) . Viner (1950) established the general principle that the welfare effect of joining a PTA such as NAFTA is ambiguous. In a simple partial equilibrium model under perfect competition, a PTA will increase trade between members, whether countries or regions, because the tariff between them has been eliminated (trade creation). If the most-efficient producer of a good is outside the PTA, the effect is to import more from the less-efficient member-producer (trade diversion). The net effect of a PTA on trade volume (as a proxy for welfare) depends, therefore, on the relative sizes of trade creation and trade diversion. Over time, the Vinerian dichotomy has evolved beyond this highly stylized model, and trade creation has become a catchall for the presumed positive effect that entering a PTA will have on trade between members. Similarly, trade diversion has become the catchall for the presumed negative effect on all trade, imports and/or exports, between a PTA member and the rest of the world.
Despite the presumed certainty of trade creation and trade diversion, the ways in which integration affects trade are many and varied, and few fit into the simple Vinerian dichotomy.
One significant non-Vinerian way for integration to affect trade volumes is through increasing returns to scale, a topic typically absent from the empirical literature, although prominent in the theoretical literature. It has also been central to the public discussion of North American integration, as, for example, Canadian firms have long argued that access to the US market would allow them to exploit economies of scale. Not only would this allow them to increase their exports to the rest of North America, but also to the rest of the world. Increasing returns also affects the volume of trade in inputs and intermediate goods used by increasing returns industries. This is because firms that expand production and exploit economies of scale need to purchase more inputs and intermediate products, which might be imported from inside or outside of North America. Thus, in contrast with the Vinerian effects, with economies of scale, NAFTA may increase trade between members and between members and non-members.
The trade creation, trade diversion, and scale economies effects arise whether one looks at trade from a national or a regional standpoint, and they would drive much of the regional variation in the effects of a PTA. This is simply because, like countries, regions differ in their abilities to match their comparative advantages to the preferences of consumers in other member and non-member regions. However, the recent literature under the rubric of the New Economic Geography suggests that things are actually much more interesting when account is taken of firms changing their locations as a response to joining a PTA. This literature, spearheaded by Krugman (1991a,b) , models various ways in which production patterns (and therefore trade patterns) can change with integration because of its effects on firms' optimal location decisions.
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One of the reasons that a PTA affects geographic trade patterns is that it alters the spatial distributions of firms' customers and suppliers. For example, consider a firm initially located in Massachusetts. By adding Mexico to the Canada-US Free Trade Area, the spatial distributions of the firm's customers and suppliers are shifted southward, creating greater incentive for the firm to move closer to Mexico, if not into Mexico itself. If the firm relocates, regional trade patterns will change because goods that were exported from Massachusetts to Canada, Mexico, and the rest of the world would instead be exported from, say, Arizona. At the same time, because the firm has moved across the continent, it is in a better position for exporting to Asia, and a worse position for exporting to Europe. Also, the firm would be more likely to import intermediate products from Asia, and the regional import pattern would change accordingly.
A second reason that a PTA affects geographic trade patterns is that it expands the set of possible places for firms to locate. Under NAFTA, Canadian and US firms that move to Mexico can do so without losing tariff-free access to their domestic markets. This affects intra-NAFTA trade by switching what had been exports, say, from Canada to the US and Mexico, into exports from Mexico to the US and Canada. Extra-NAFTA trade would also be affected, as a firm that was exporting from Canada to the rest of the world would instead export from Mexico. The New Economic Geography literature suggests that these location effects are much stronger when there are cross-firm linkages whereby a firm's marginal costs are lower when other firms are nearby.
With these linkages there is a tendency for linked firms to agglomerate, creating industry centers.
These examples are by no means exhaustive, but they do provide sufficient illustration of the theoretical inadequacies of the Vinerian dichotomy. The remainder of the paper is devoted to seeing whether these theoretical inadequacies translate into empirical ones. I find ample evidence that the effects of NAFTA have not conformed to the Vinerian dichotomy, and conclude that the customs union theory needs to be reworked to include a substantial accounting of geography and scale economies.
The empirical model that I use, the gravity model, has become the workhorse for estimating the effects of PTAs on trade volume. In a gravity model, bilateral trade is assumed to be an increasing function of the national incomes of the trading partners, and a decreasing function of the distance between them. The effects of PTAs are modeled with dummy variables.
For my present purposes, the gravity model has advantages and disadvantages, both arising from its simplicity. While it allows me to examine the effects of NAFTA on large number of trading combinations, it is not versatile enough to attribute the effects on aggregate trade to trade creation, trade diversion, the mobility of firms, agglomeration, etc.
From a practical standpoint, the major advantage of the gravity model is that the researcher does not need to specify the underlying trade processes, although that it is largely ad hoc has meant that the gravity model has met with much suspicion by international trade theorists. Deardorff (1984, p. 504) , however, concluded that the gravity model tells "us something very important about what happens in international trade, even if they do not tell us why." Recently, though, the gravity model has "gone from an embarrassing poverty of theoretical foundations to an embarrassment of riches." 3 In fact, as shown by Bergstrand (1985 Bergstrand ( , 1989 and Deardorff (1998), among others, the gravity model can be derived within a variety of standard theoretical frameworks. The estimates I present below demonstrate vividly the greatest strengths and weaknesses of the gravity model. On the one hand, its simplicity allows for the estimation of a large number of region-to-region NAFTA effects that would be extremely difficult to obtain using any other method. On the other hand, it provides little guidance to explain why the NAFTA effects that it detects. Nevertheless, the results to suggest that geography may have played an extremely large role.
Two recent gravity studies that also look at the effects of NAFTA on aggregate trade between NAFTA members, both using national-level data only. Krueger (1999) found that NAFTA has had no statistically significant effect on intra-North American trade, although she did find a statistically significant decrease in imports from Europe. Gould (1998) , who only considered intra-North American trade, found that NAFTA has had a significant effect on trade between the United States and Mexico, but not on trade between the United States and Canada or Mexico and Canada. 4 One reason for these lukewarm results is the small number of observations of post-NAFTA national-level trade volume. As will be apparent below, this is not a problem in the present study.
I. The Data
In constructing my empirical model, many of the choices are driven by the availability of data on North American regional trade. This study is based on a unique data set from Statistics Canada on provincial merchandise imports and exports to and from all 50 US states, the District of Columbia, and most countries of the world. It is the same data set that formed the basis of earlier studies of the effect of the U.S.-Canada border on trade (see McCallum, 1995 and Helliwell, 1996) . However, because I do not wish to consider the additional complication of the border effect, I do not include data on intra-provincial trade.
In addition to provincial trade data for 1990-97, I include data from World Trade Flows, 1980 Flows, -1997 Because the four European countries in the sample are also members of the European Union (EU), the regression equation also includes dummy variables to control for the transformation of the European Community (EC) into the EU in 1993. Specifically, EU is a vector of three dummy variables for post-EU trade: one each for trade between members, trade from a non-member to a member, and trade from a member to a non-member. Note that because the model has trading-pair intercepts, and because the four European countries in the data set were all members of the EC at the start of the sample period, the EU dummy variables only account for the differences between the two regimes. The effect of the EC is already accounted for by the relevant trading-pair intercepts.
The least squares estimates of equation (1) My primary interest is in the signs and levels of the estimated coefficients on the interregional NAFTA dummies, listed in Table 2a and converted into percentage changes in Table 2b .
In addition, Tables 3 and 4 
III. Trade Between North American Regions

A. Canada-U.S. trade
According Exceptions to this were the Rocky Mountain region, which saw its exports to Canada fall by 6 percent, whereas its imports were effectively unchanged; and the Far West, which saw its exports to Canada fall by an even smaller amount. The Great Lakes and South Central regions saw the largest increases in exports to Canada, while the largest increases in imports from Canada were for the Great Lakes and Southeast regions.
B. Canada-Mexico Trade
As reported in Table 3c , NAFTA had a large effect on trade between Mexico and Canada, with significant regional variation. For Canada as a whole, NAFTA increased exports to Mexico by 12 percent, and imports from Mexico by 48 percent. However, Eastern Canada saw its exports to and imports from Mexico drop by 15 and 12 percent, respectively, whereas
Western Canada saw increases of 31 and 26 percent, respectively. For Central Canada, NAFTA had no effect on exports to Mexico, while it increased imports from Mexico by 52 percent.
C. Trade Creation?
As Aggregating the region-region effects to the region-country level, negative trade effects also arise: the estimated effect on both directions of Eastern Canada's trade with the United States and Mexico are negative and large. Finally, when the regional effects are aggregated to the country-country level, all results have NAFTA leading to an increase in intra-NAFTA trade.
IV. Trade with the Rest of the World
A. Canada
As reported in Tables 4a and 4b , the effects of NAFTA on Canada's regional exports to Europe and Asia were, for the most part, consistent with the Vinerian prediction of trade diversion. NAFTA's effects on total Canadian exports to Europe and Asia were decreases of 12 and 8 percent, respectively. Although the magnitude of these effects differed across Canadian regions, all regions saw decreased exports to both Asia and Europe. For both continents, Eastern
Canada experienced the largest drops in exports (greater than 16 percent), whereas Western
Canada had the smallest drop in exports to Europe (6 percent), and Central Canada had the smallest drop in exports to Asia (3 percent).
On the import side, the effect of NAFTA on total Canadian imports from Europe was a small increase of less than 2 percent, whereas its effect on imports from Asia was a small decrease of 3 percent. At the regional level, Eastern and Western Canada both had large decreases in imports from both Europe and Asia, whereas Central Canada saw small and statistically insignificant increases in imports from both continents. So, although the effects of NAFTA on total Canadian imports from each of Asia and Europe were effectively zero, the real story is at the regional level. Consistent with Vinerian trade diversion, Eastern and Western
Canada both experienced large decreases in imports from Europe and Asia.
B. Mexico
As reported in Tables 4a and 4b , the effects of NAFTA on Mexico's exports to the rest of the world were mixed. Exports to Europe were unaffected by NAFTA, whereas exports to Asia were 14 percent higher. As for Mexican imports, NAFTA led to an 8 percent drop in imports from Europe, whereas it led to an 11 percent increase in imports from Asia. Note though that none of these estimated effects of NAFTA on Mexican trade with Europe and Asia is statistically significant at traditional level.
C. Trade Diversion?
At the national and regional levels, the effects of NAFTA on Canada's and Mexico's trade with the non-NAFTA world shows that there has been more going on than simple trade diversion. Although most of the results for Canadian trade are consistent with trade diversion, the story was different for Mexico. In particular, the results indicate that NAFTA has increased the volume of trade with Asia, although the estimated effect on exports and imports are statistically significant at only the 18 and 15 percent levels, respectively.
V. Summary and Conclusions
According to my results, the effects of NAFTA on the volume and pattern of North Numbers in italics are the White-corrected standard errors. Bold indicates significance at the 5% level. 
